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This study examines the sensitivity of commercial bank stock excess returns to the 
volatility level and financial risk factors, measured by interest rate risk and exchange 
rate risk across the recent Asian financial crisis horizon, via Multivariate GARCH in 
Mean (MGARCH-M) model. Application of time varying risk model into bank's stocks 
is of special importance as both the financial risk factors and the stock returns volatility 
varied substantially in the Asian recent financial crisis. 
Generally, MGARCH (p, q)-M process captures almost all of the linear dependence in 
both the returns' mean, and the residual's variance of the fitted model. The results of 
this study further show that in Malaysia, the pattern of risk sensitivity is about the same 
for both large and small banks during the crisis period. Unlike studies from developed 
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markets, the portfolio partition in the case of Malaysia did not provide significant 
difference on bank stocks risk exposures. 
Before the crisis, the excess returns generally followed white noise process and the 
residual variances have strong GARCH effects, indicating that the current volatility of 
bank's stocks persisted from past periods. The banks equity returns and its volatility 
fails to show a pricing relationship with its volatility level and financial risk factors, 
due to close regulatory framework set by government on the economy system. 
During the crisis period, commercial banks' hedging activities, and government 
interventions in both the fmancial factors, had stabilized the bank stocks' volatility. 
This can be explained because during crisis, bank stocks' returns followed a white 
noise process while the GARCH effects in the variances equation are very weak. 
Furthermore, when the market is in disorder, bank's stocks performance could be better 
explained by the overall market's performance and the annoyances in the market. 
After the fmancial control, due to the unexpected interest rate policy and the merger 
announcement, large bank's returns are increasingly sensitive to its own volatility. The 
stock's prices of small banks are only exposed to interest rate volatility but its 
magnitude is relatively larger than large banks'. The forced consolidation program has 
st�ongly affected the confidence of investors on the performance of small banks as the 
small bank's volatility is significantly driven by the interest rate volatility. 
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It seems that the recent crisis had affected the exposure of bank's stocks to risk. 
Investors seem to be more actively engaged as reflected by the significant risks concern 
in bank's stocks pricing. The control and announced consolidation program fail to 
regain investors' full confidence in bank's stocks. Nevertheless, in view of long run 
welfare, the increasing risk concern in bank's stocks will contribute to the development 
of the domestic banks. When the market prices the stocks, the prices will reflect the 
true value and the performance of the banks. This will further enhance the market 
efficiency on banking stocks and contribute to future expansion, by ensuring an 
effective intermediation of fund to the efficient banks. 
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Abstrak tesis yang dikemukakan kepada Senat Universiti Putra Malaysia sebagai 
memenuhi keperluan untuk ijazah Master Sains 
PULANGAN SAHAM BANK DAN KEMUDAHURAP AN KEW ANGAN: 
MODEL MGARCH-M 
OLEH 
HOOY CHEE WOOl 
Februari 2002 
Pengerusi : Profesor Madya Dr Tan Hui Boon 
Fakulti : Ekonomi dan Pengurusan 
Kajian ini menguji kepekaan pulangan lebihan saham bank komersil terhadap tahap 
kemudahurapan dan faktor risiko kewangan yang diukur oleh risiko kadar bunga dan 
risiko kadar petukaran matawang asing menerusi tempoh krisis kewangan Asian yang 
berlaku kebelakangan ini, dengan menggunakan Model Multivariat Teritlak 
Autoregresi dan Heteroskedastisiti Bersyarat Dalam Min (MGARCH-M). Aplikasi 
model risiko yang berlandaskan masa adalah sangat penting untuk saham bank kerana 
dalam krisis kewangan kebelakangan ini, kedua-dua faktor kewangan dan 
ketidaktentuan pulangan saham telah berubah dengan besar. 
Secara amnya, MGARCH-M merangkupi hampir semua pergantungan linear dalam 
min pulangan dan varian bagi baki model yang terpilih. Keputusan kajian ini 
menunjukan bahawa di Malaysia, bentuk kepekaan risiko bagi bank besar dan kecil 
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semasa tempoh krisis adalah agak sarna. Berbeza dengan kajian dari pasaran negara 
maju, pembahagian portfolio di Malaysia tidak memberi perbezaan nyata dalam 
pendedahan risiko saham bank. 
Sebelum krisis, pulangan saham bank umumnya mempunyai proses riuh putih dan 
varians bakinya mempunyai kesan GARCH yang kuat, menunjukkan kemudahurapan 
semasa adalah berterusan dari masa lampau. Pulagan ekuiti bank dan 
kemudahurapannya gagal menunjukan hubugan harga dengan kemudahurapan sendiri 
dan factor risiko kewangan, disebabkan oleh penetapan peraturan yang ketat digubah 
oleh kerajaan atas system ekonomi. 
Semasa krisis berlaku, kegiatan lindung harga oleh bank komercial dan campurtangan 
kerajaan dalam kedua-dua factor kewangan, telah menstabilkan kemudahurapan saham 
bank:- Ini boleh diterangkan kerana semasa krisis kewangan berlaku, saham bank 
mempunyai proses riuh putih sementara kesan GARCH di persamaan varians adalah 
sangat lemah. Tambahan pula, apabila pasaran tidak teratur, prestasi saham bank lebih 
sesuai diterangkan oleh pre stasi keseluruhan pasaran serta gangguan pasaran. 
Selepas kawalan modal, disebabkan oleh polisi kadar bunga yang tidak terjangka dan 
pengumuman pergabungan bank, pulangan saham bank besar telah bertambah sensitive 
kepada kemudahurapan sendirinya. Harga saham bank kecil hanya terdedah kepada 
kemudahurapan kadar bunga, tetapi kesan kemudahurapan kadar bunga ke atas bank 
kecil adalah relatif lebih besar daripada kesannya ke atas bank besar. Program 
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pergabWlgan paksa telah kuat menpengaruhi keyakinan pelabur atas peneapaian bank 
keeil kerana kemudahurapan bank keeil sekarang telah didorong oleh kemudahurapan 
kadar bWlgan. 
Nampaknya krisis kebelakangan ini telah menpengaruhi pendedahan saham bank ke 
atas risiko. Pelabur nampaknya menjadi lebih aktif dalam urusniaga sebagaimana yang 
dicerminkan oleh peningkatan perhatian terhadap risiko, dalam proses peletakan harga 
saham bank. Program pengawalan dan pergabWlgan yang diumumkan oleh kerajaan 
gagal memulihkan keyakinan para pelabur dengan sepenuhnya terhadap saham bank 
domestik. Walau bagaimanapWl, Wltuk kebajikan janka panjang, peningkatan 
perhatian terhadap risiko akan menyumbang kepada pembangWlan bank-bank 
domestic. Apabila harga saham ditentukan oleh pasaran, harga terbabit akan 
mencerminkan nilai sebenar and pre stasi bank-bank. Ini akan meningkatkan kecekapan 
pasaran bagi saham-saham bank dan menyumbang kepada perkembangan bank pada 
mas a depan, dengan memastikan satu penyaluran wang yang berkesan kepada bank­
bank eekap. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
During the recent Asian fmancial crisis, banks' failure rules the day. In the case 
of Malaysia, where the banking institutions are under close regulation by the 
government, the scenario is quite different. Malaysian government is particularly 
concerns about the development of the banking industry and its performance. As such, 
during the crisis, the government had conducted various rescue program to ensure that 
the industry preserved its stability and stand in its competitive position. This has more 
or less affected the performance of the commercial bank's stocks. 
The movement of the commercial bank's stocks is seen as an important 
indicator of performance of the commercial banks. This however, depend much on the 
sensitivity of the bank's stocks to various risk factors, especially exchange rate and 
interest rate. If the bank's stocks are very sensitive to those risk factors, then the 
performance of the bank will lead by the movement of these factors. Otherwise, the 
bank will be able to remain competitive under various circumstances. The sensitivity 
nevertheless, depends much on how bank practices its risk management, beside some 
external factors, such as the investor's behavior and confidence. 
This study covers the relationship of the returns of domestic commercial bank's 
stocks with the risk of financial factors across the time horizon of the recent financial 
crisis. As an emerging country, the banking industry in Malaysia is still immature 
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compared to that of developed nations. The rational of this study is to provide an 
extensive understanding of the natures of various risk return trade-off of Malaysian 
commercial bank's stocks. By analyzing the effect of the unanticipated changes of the 
exchange rate and interest rate on the bank's stocks during crisis, it may provide an 
alternative to policy maker in their decision-making regarding the effectiveness of their 
policies. 
The fIrst section of this chapter addresses the Asian fInancial crisis, starting 
from its background to the volatilities of the fInancial factors and bank's stocks. The 
second part of this chapter covers the problem statement of the research. The objectives 
of the study are stated in the third section. Finally, the last section emphasizes the 
signifIcance of the research. 
1.1 Commercial Banks and the Crisis 
1.1.1 Asian Financial Crisis 
During the 1990s, there were three fInancial crises in the global economy; the 
ERM crisis in 1993, the Latin Mexico fmancial crisis in 1995, and the recent Asian 
fInancial crisis in 1997. The recent Asian financial crisis has its own unique features 
due to the severity of the contagion effect. Thailand was the first victims of the Asian 
financial crisis and the explosion of the contagion effect was too fast to be expected. 
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From a localized currency crisis in Thailand, it augmented into a regional financial 
crisis in East Asia, and further spread to Russia and Latin America, within just a year 
time. 
The financial crisis became official on July 2, 1997 when the IMF team 
arrived in Bangkok to help resolving the economics crisis . After the depreciation of 
the Thai bath, the Philippine peso and the Indonesian rupiah were also forced to float 
more freely. The selling pressure was spreading tremendously and hit the currency of 
Malaysia ringgit (RM) and Singapore dollar. The pressures on the currencies then 
spread outside South-East Asia to the Korean won, the Hong Kong dollar and the 
Taiwan dollar. From one of the best performing regions in the world, the economies of 
Indonesia, Thailand and Korea were contracted by -1 3.7%, -9.4% and -5.8% 
respectively in 1998. The crisis also features the largest financial rescue in history from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)1 (BNM, 1999). 
In Malaysia, the turmoil affected the economics and business dynamism in the 
nation through various prospects. The KLSE composite index crashed badly and RM 
had devaluated to its historical low level relative to usn. The fall of the RM 
consequently causes the deterioration of the composite index and market capitalization 
in KLSE. As depicted in figure 1 ,  the composite index drops more than 700 points 
within a few months after the crisis occurred, so as the market capitalization. The index 
I For example, in end-1997, just a few month after the crisis occur, the IMP had injected SDR 2.9 billion 
(about US$ 3.9 billion) for Thailand, SDR 7.338 billion (about US$ 10.14 billion) for Indonesia, SDR 
15.5 billion (about US$ 21 billion) for Korea. 
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started to recover just after September 1998, when the government imposed the capital 
control package. 
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About a year after the cnSlS, the government had taken a drastic step by 
implementing the selected capital control and pegged its exchange rate at 3.8 RM per 1 
USD in order to prevent its currency from further deterioration. In order to stabilize the 
economy, Danahharta was established to solve the problem of bad loans in financial 
institutions, followed by Danahmodal to inject funds to re-capitalize and rescue the 
problematic financial institutions. The consolidation program of the domestic financial 
sectors was later been announced to reposition the domestic banks and finance 
companies. 
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1.1.2 Volatility of Financial Factors 
The cnSlS, spread to almost all the regional economy and created many 
bankruptcy and bank failures in the cOWltries involved. Malaysia was of no exception 
from the regional crisis. During the crisis, besides the stock market, two of the 
COWltry'S most important financial indicators, the exchange rate and interest rate, 
suffered the most changes and became very volatile. 
The Malaysian currency depreciated to its historically low relative to USD 
within a few months. Figure 2 depicts the changes of RMlUSD exchange rate from 
January 1995 to July 2000, with a sharp deterioration of the RM during the crisis. The 
RM was fixed on September 1998 after the implementation of the capital control. 
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Figure 2: Exchange rate level from January 1995 to July 2000 (RM / USD) 
In order to counter the crisis, the Malaysian government adjusted the market's 
interest rate on several occasions. As depicted in Figure 3, the trend of the interest rate 
level in Malaysia is quite stable before July 1997. After the crisis occurred, interest rate 
level rose to a significant high level (over 10%) and dropped back to fewer than 7% 
just within a few weeks time. There were changes several times along 1998, but the 
interest rate level began to fall step by step after capital control was instituted at the end 
of 1998. Currently, the interest rate level is about 3%. 
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Figure 3: Interest rate level from January 1995 to July 2000 C3-month KLIBOR rate) 
From figure 2 and figure 3, note that the changes of both financial factors 
during the crisis was abnormally larges. Using the ARMA-GARCH model, the 
volatility of the exchange rate and interest rate are generated and depicted in figure 4 
and figure 5 respectively. 
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